



EXPLAINING CRIMINAL SANCTIONS IN INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY LAW 
 IRINA D. MANTA† 
This symposium piece first seeks to unpack the relationship between 
intellectual property infringement and property offenses, and then to 
understand how the connection between the two has informed when the 
former is criminalized. The piece examines the porous nature of the 
boundary line between intangible and tangible resources, showing the 
at-times uncomfortable fit of the non-rivalrous label to intellectual 
property. An analysis of the respective harms of the two types of 
violations follows. This symposium contribution shows how lawmakers 
have treated patents differently from other forms of intellectual property 
by choosing not to criminalize their infringement, due both to utilitarian 
reasons and public choice rationales. While historically the entities who 
pushed for harsher sanctions for copyright violations in particular have 
often not encountered resistance, a combination of large tech 
companies’ and grassroots organizations’ activism has thwarted 
attempts at strengthened enforcement in recent times. The political 
landscape of copyright lawmaking, however, may be on its way to the 
greater degree of equipoise between support and opposition to greater 
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INTRODUCTION1 
The criminal law is frequently a last resort when other methods of 
resolution have failed. When an individual engages in anti-social 
behavior, his victim and bystanders might begin by reasoning with him 
one-on-one. As a next step, the community would take measures, a 
mixture of carrots and sticks, perhaps involving ostracism. If the 
problem is of sufficient gravity, the civil court system might intervene, 
providing a forum for the victim to seek official redress in the form of 
making the perpetrator cease his behavior and, in some cases, provide 
reparations for past wrongs. Punishing crime is expensive and forces the 
government, and hence the public, to pay in exchange for greater safety, 
retribution, and deterrence of both the specific offender and potential 
future wrongdoers.  
We traditionally associate criminal law with offenses that involve the 
use of force against people and things. If you try to kill me, it would 
likely be unwise for me to rely on trying to reason with you afterwards 
or assume that ostracism alone will prevent you from doing so in the 
future. While a monetary fine might provide some reparation to me, it 
is unlikely to do so fully, and the fear of such fines may not be enough 
to assure society that you will not come after me or another potential 
victim down the line. The same is true for many property-based 
offenses. After all, every time you consider stealing something, there is 
 
1 Portions of this piece have been adapted from Irina D. Manta, The Puzzle of Criminal 
Sanctions for Intellectual Property Infringement, 24 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 469 (2011) 
[hereinafter “Manta, Puzzle of Criminal Sanctions”] and Irina D. Manta, The High Cost of Low 
Sanctions, 66 FLA. L. REV. 157 (2014). 
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a chance that you will not get caught. So you may well conclude from a 
cost-benefit calculation that you may as well give it another shot and 
pay a fine the percentage of the time that you do get nabbed. At the end 
of the day, as criminal law scholar Erin Sheley summarized in short, 
“[b]oth criminal and tort law can be said to redress a form of wrong.”2 
The criminal justice system relies on a mix of retribution, denunciation, 
utilitarian, and other moral factors (some of which stand in tension with 
each other).3 
Turning our attention to intellectual property offenses specifically, 
the rationale for criminal sanctions in that area—which are available for 
some forms of infringement in copyright, trademarks, and trade 
secrets—is not immediately obvious. The need for a legal rather than 
extra-legal response is, in itself, not a mystery. Intellectual property 
infringers often have little to no direct interaction with their victims, and 
so interpersonal negotiations or community responses would generally 
not yield much by way of redress. It therefore makes intuitive sense why 
an IP owner would need to turn to the civil court system for help. Why 
would legislators, however, at times enact criminal laws to respond to 
this kind of non-violent offense? The answer turns on both utilitarian 
factors and the public choice landscape of U.S. politics. To understand 
both of these facets, it is useful to begin with an examination of how 
analogies to property offenses have historically led to the 
criminalization of some forms of intellectual property infringement. 
Part I of this symposium piece explains the relationship between 
intellectual property infringement and property violations such as theft, 
which includes a discussion of the relative harms that different kinds of 
infringement impose as compared to the harms inflicted as connected to 
tangible property. Part II shows why patents have been treated 
differently in the context of criminal law, both as a matter of utilitarian 
concern and public choice rationale. Part III discusses what happens 
when intellectual property owners, such as in the case of copyright, push 
too far and eventually a popular backlash results. The piece ends in a 
brief Conclusion section. 
I. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY INFRINGEMENT AND PROPERTY OFFENSES 
This Part describes the development of the concept of theft as it 
applies to intellectual property infringement. It then analyzes the harms 
 
2 Erin L. Sheley, Tort Answers to the Problem of Corporate Criminal Mens Rea, 97 N.C. 
L. REV. 773, 812 (2019). 
3 See id. at 812-813. 
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of intellectual property infringement to advance a clearer understanding 
of the ways in which that label does or does not fit, and how there may 
be more applicable analogies in the realm of property law violations. 
Examining property offenses in a more nuanced way shows that 
intellectual property and its infringement may transcend the usual 
binary of rivalrousness or lack thereof. A broader understanding of 
rivalrousness than one based on mere physical use allows for goods and 
their infringement to lie on a spectrum of rivalrousness. Offenses such 
as vandalism and trespass have implicitly long recognized the 
possibility of that spectrum. 
A. How the Intellectual Property Infringer Became a Thief 
Defining even the theft of tangible property turns out to be remarkably 
fraught in the first place. Legal dictionaries speak of the “felonious taking 
and removing of another’s personal property with the intent of depriving 
the true owner of it.”4 Problems abound in understanding what makes 
property someone’s own (that which may not be stolen, is the circular 
answer), what it means to take it, how we determine intent in this context, 
and what form of deprivation qualifies. Regardless of these theoretical 
problems, ancient societies felt little compunction punishing theft, which 
they perceived as an attack against God’s will and for which they were 
willing to award the death penalty.5 While most countries have eliminated 
the death penalty for acts involving deprivations of property,6 they have 
retained a variety of other harsh criminal punishments such as 
imprisonment.  
The application of similar principles to intangible resources both 
accompanied and reinforced in turn the propertization of IP. As intellectual 
property increased in value, often much outpacing in the business context 
what the brick-and-mortar assets were worth, the stakes grew higher 
around IP infringement as well as around the regime addressing its 
deterrence and punishment.7 Once the barrier had been cleared to use 
criminal sanctions in this context, the question regarding its particular 
applications changed from “whether” to “when”. This has, to some extent, 
paralleled the general expansion of criminal law in the punishment of 
 
4 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1615 (9th ed. 2009).  
5 See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein & Thomas P. Brown, Cybersecurity in the Payment Card 
Industry, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 203, 204 (2008).  
6 China remains an exception. See, e.g., CORNELL CENTER ON THE DEATH PENALTY 
WORLDWIDE, DEATH PENALTY DATABASE: CHINA (2014), 
https://www.deathpenaltyworldwide.org/country-search-post.cfm?country=China. 
7 GERALDINE SZOTT MOOHR, JACQUELINE LIPTON & IRINA MANTA, THE CRIMINAL LAW 
OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 2D (2016). 
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property-related offenses, where the list of actionable violations 
transitioned from violent crimes like robbery to non-violent ones like 
larceny.  
Intellectual property infringement does not meet the strictest dictionary 
definitions of theft because an IP owner is virtually never completely 
deprived of a good. That owner’s complaint tends to be that her intangible 
goods have experienced an often-significant reduction in value as a result 
of the infringement rather than that she has lost the ability to use the goods 
in a literal sense. I have argued that this strengthens the case for an 
understanding of intellectual property infringement as vandalism (defined 
as an act that involves some degree of damage to the property) or trespass 
(in cases of unauthorized access that did not necessarily result in damage) 
rather than theft.8 Suffice it to say here, however, that an understanding of 
intellectual property infringement as some form of property offense—
whatever the particular offense may be—contains the elements of basic 
legitimacy, and that arguments against the use of criminal sanctions in the 
context of intangible goods would do better not to place overly great 
reliance on the distinctions between IP and property. 
Indeed, as I and others have argued, even the old chestnut that 
characterizes intellectual property as non-rivalrous does not hold up to 
closer scrutiny.9 The traditional definition of non-rivalrousness as 
pertaining to things that cannot be used by two people simultaneously is 
unhelpfully formalistic. The real question which we have to confront in 
daily life is whether one person’s enjoyment of a good conflicts with 
another’s enjoyment. As a matter of utility, be it economic, hedonic, or of 
any other sort, that is ultimately the relevant consideration. Once one 
accepts that definition, many different examples in intellectual property 
come to mind that involve no physical inability for a good to be shared, 
but rather a conflict in its enjoyment. For one, this can occur in the context 
of luxury trademarked goods.10 Wearing a Gucci purse feels less special if 
too many people have one (worse, at some point one may be mistaken for 
a user of counterfeit goods oneself—which is very different from the 
image many Gucci purse wearers want to portray).11 In the copyright 
context, the distribution of a surreptitiously-made recording of an 
 
8 See Irina D. Manta & Robert E. Wagner, Intellectual Property Infringement as 
Vandalism, 18 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 331 (2015).  
9 See Irina D. Manta, Keeping IP Real, HOUSTON L. REV. (forthcoming) (on file with 
author); Manta & Wagner, supra note 8, at 338; James Y. Stern, Intellectual Property and the 
Myth of Nonrivalry (on file with author).  
10 Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II, ch. XV § 1502(a), 98 Stat. 2178-79 (codified as amended at 
18 U.S.C. § 2320 (2006 & Supp. 112008)). 
11 See Irina D. Manta, Hedonic Trademarks, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 241, 248-49 (2013).  
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exclusive concert at the Met potentially detracts from the experience for 
which live spectators paid dearly.12  
This goes much beyond the case of luxury trademarked goods and their 
copyright equivalents, however. One of the charges made explicitly or 
implicitly against those who rail about illegal streaming/downloading of 
their intellectual property, be it in the form of songs or movies or the like, 
is that they are greedy. As long as some people buy goods legally, does it 
really matter that Game of Thrones episodes are routinely streamed 
without payment? The answer is two-fold. First, illegal streaming or 
downloading can have a tendency to snowball. Many users who would 
normally stream for payment may become resentful of doing so when 
others receive the good for free. The legal users may in fact feel like they 
are not just subsidizing free-riders, but that they are paying much higher 
prices than they would but for the illegal streamers. The underlying theory 
is that at least some of the illegal streamers would pay for Game of Thrones 
if the choice was between paying and not watching the episodes at all. The 
money that this set of users refuses to pay can drive up prices for what is 
left of the population that streams legally.  
The second, related point in such cases is that the producer has put out 
a good that is desired by a significant number of people, but she receives 
proportionally little value in return. For one, this may feel disheartening 
and demoralizing even outside of economic questions. The producers of 
artistic works, in particular, often think that they have infused these works 
with their hearts and souls, and it can be troublesome to have large groups 
of individuals essentially say that this intellectual property is good enough 
to be consumed for free but not good enough to spend a few dollars on. 
The reality is that virtually anyone who wanted to watch Game of Thrones 
was legally able to wait until a season ended, purchase an HBO Now pass 
for one month at $14.99, and watch a full season in that month (each season 
only had between six and ten episodes).13 This is not an unbearable cost 
for most fans, and yet a large number chose not to pay it.   
Despite a number of measures to prevent it, illegal streaming persists, 
and it is fair to assume—as mentioned above—that at least some 
percentage of the individuals involved would be willing to pay for the 
goods if this costless alternative did not exist. Just like with the non-
rivalrousness aspect specifically, a more flexible approach as to whether 
intellectual property infringement can be likened to property offenses 
generally makes sense. Leaving aside some of the matters regarding 
sentimental value of goods that come up in the case of personal property, 
 
12 See Manta & Wagner, supra note 8, at 338. 
13 See HBO, https://www.hbo.com/order (last accessed Apr. 14, 2019). 
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most situations involving theft or vandalism of tangible property produce 
negative consequences for the owner because she loses all or part of the 
value of her property. The physical loss or damage, while non-negligible, 
does not tend to be the central feature of the event. If a malicious neighbor 
tramples down and destroys potatoes I just grew, I can no longer sell them 
(or not at the same price). Similarly, if I sell my music for a living, illegal 
downloading of the music may eventually hamper my ability to sell my 
goods.  
This will not always occur. For example, some people may choose to 
buy my music legally after initial illegal downloads. Indeed, in specific 
cases listeners may encounter my music through such downloads who 
otherwise would not have bothered taking the financial risk of purchasing 
it without testing. Also, artists make their revenues through a number of 
different avenues. A singer could witness a cut in profits via illegal 
downloads that is compensated through later increased sale of concert 
tickets and official merchandise. The empirics behind some of these 
tradeoffs are highly uncertain and context-dependent, however, and one 
might query why the illegal downloaders (and/or those who offer those 
goods) rather than the artist herself should be the ones to make the decision 
of how a work should be sold or given away in the marketplace.  
The artist always has the option to distribute the good for free, or to ask 
for voluntary donations—indeed, Radiohead did just that a dozen years 
ago when it released an album on the Internet that anyone could download 
and pay a price of their choice.14 The same is true of the potato farmer. He 
can decide how much of his agricultural goods to distribute at no cost as a 
matter of marketing (imagine a cooked version as a free sample at a 
farmer’s market) or good will. Some farms control their distribution 
strictly, while others including a number of apple-picking farms and the 
like assume that they can give buyers some discretion when it comes to 
sampling goods and that in the end, the total purchases made will 
financially justify earlier investments in offering samples.  
Musical artists have so many different ways to offer samples, however, 
that it is not clear why whole-hog free downloading of their entire albums 
will be in the interest of most artists. They can allow listeners to hear the 
first thirty seconds of some or all songs, or they can make a few songs 
available for free while expecting purchase before a listener can have 
access to the entire album. Just like we do not expect potato farmers to 
allow potential buyers to take bites out of every potato before purchase, it 
is unrealistic to expect that most artists can or should be able to afford 
 
14 Josh Tyrangiel, Radiohead Says: Pay What You Want, TIME (Oct. 1, 2007), 
http://content.time.com/time/arts/article/0,8599,1666973,00.html. 
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having large numbers of people consume their goods for free to encourage 
sales. 
B. The Harms of Intellectual Property Infringement Juxtaposed with 
Those of Property Crimes 
Criminal law is generally supposed to be used in the case of conduct 
involving nontrivial harm and wrongful conduct.15 As discussed above, both 
property and intellectual property offenses reduce the wealth of owners and 
provide disincentives for further investments. One distinction in this context 
between property and IP offenses is that property crimes have a greater 
potential for endangering victims’ sense of physical safety. IP infringers 
generally operate remotely, working behind a computer screen or at a 
different facility, unlike thieves and vandals that often personally intrude on 
one’s space.  
A reason that has been given for why criminal sanctions are more 
justified for property offenses than IP ones is that we must place greater 
emphasis on protecting the bodily integrity of victims than on punishing 
financial loss, and a thief of tangible goods could suddenly attack if a victim 
caught her in the act, or violence could ensue when the victim tries to protect 
his property (including potentially through the use of weapons). The law 
does not view this distinction as crucial for culpability even within property 
offenses, however, and someone can land in jail for improperly wiring 
money out of someone else’s account, which is an offense that would also 
not present the potential for violent clashes as such.  
On the issue of wrongfulness, convictions both in the property and 
intellectual property contexts generally require evidence of intent.16 The 
particular level of wrongfulness differs in each scenario, but it is safe to 
assume that offenders who are criminally convicted in both the property and 
IP worlds usually have a high level of awareness of the illegality of their 
conducts. 
American courts have frequently recognized informally the relationship 
between the two types of offenses, especially when they have referred to IP 
infringers’ actions as “intellectual property theft” or “piracy”. The Supreme 
Court has not expressed its views on the subject directly. The closest it came 
was in Dowling v. United States, where it ruled that the National Stolen 
Property Act (NSPA) that criminalized the interstate transportation of stolen 
property did not extend to bootleg records.17 The Court called a copyrighted 
 
15 See DOUGLAS HUSAK, OVERCRIMINALIZATION: THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 
103-19 (2008).  
16 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 220.1-.3 (1962). 
17 473 U.S. 207 (1985).  
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good “no ordinary chattel” and emphasized the inability of infringers to take 
over physical control of copyright or completely to deprive the owner of the 
ability to use it.18 As is apparent from multiple statements in the opinion, the 
Court was concerned about interfering with congressional intent and pointed 
out that 1) Congress could have explicitly included copyright in the NSPA if 
it wished to do so and 2) the NSPA could be used as a tool to criminalize 
trademark infringement (when Congress had known to legislate in this area 
separately shortly before, in the narrow context of counterfeiting) and even 
patent infringement (which Congress has not done to this day).19 Justice 
Powell argued in dissent that the NSPA does in fact cover the transportation 
of bootlegs, an act that he described as involving the offenses of theft, 
unauthorized use, and conversion.20  
The subsequent judicial history is muddled, with lower courts 
distinguishing Dowling in a number of cases and referring explicitly to 
infringed intellectual property as having been “stolen”. While lower courts’ 
inconsistent application of Dowling could be explained by (willful or 
innocent) mistake or by the statutory changes to the NSPA to include the 
transmission of some forms of data,21 it may also evidence an understanding 
on the part of the lower courts that Dowling did not truly reject the 
possibility that theft and conversion of intangible assets can occur.  
In short, and while a final pronouncement by the Supreme Court remains 
to be heard, the parallels between the harms of intellectual property 
infringement and those of a number of property crimes are striking. IP 
infringement can partially or almost completely destroy the value of a good 
and reduce the incentives for productive behavior just like property crimes 
do. The criminal law also tends to demand willfulness before punishing 
either type of conduct. On the other hand, IP infringement is generally more 
remote and hence does not tend to interfere directly with the safety of 
owners. Further, complete deprivation of a good does not usually occur in 
the IP context. Last, on average, IP infringement may be less wrongful than 
property offenses because the boundaries of IP are less clearly delineated 
and hence accidental illegal conduct is more likely. As a result, courts must 
pay special attention to whether IP infringers genuinely had the mens rea 
necessary to meet criminal statutory definitions. 
 
18 Id. at 216. 
19 See id. at 220-27.  
20 Id. at 232 (Powell, J., dissenting).  
21 See, e.g., United States v. Farraj, 142 F. Supp. 2d 484, 490 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); United 
States v. Alavi, No. CR07-429-PHX-NVW, 2008 WL 1971391, at *2 (D. Ariz. May 2, 2008). 
But see United States v. Brown, 925 F.2d 1301, 1307 (10th Cir. 1991) (stating that the 
Dowling decision removed all intangible property from the purview of the NSPA). 
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II. THE NOT-SO-CURIOUS CASE OF PATENTS  
There is a noticeable gap in the criminal law framework that deals 
with intellectual property infringement, which is that it does not cover 
patent infringement. The roots of this predicament can be found in a 
combination of 1) utilitarian and other moral considerations and 2) 
public choice explanations. This Section will focus on the differences 
between the various branches of intellectual property, the relative ease 
of infringing on a large scale in these regimes, the possibility of using 
tools other than criminal law to lower infringement levels, and the 
respective risks of overdeterrence. 
The first question is, again, the one of harm. Inventors and other 
patent owners have complained at times that the sanctions imposed on 
infringers are insufficient, and that the process of civil litigation to 
vindicate rights in this context is really expensive. Indeed, “[p]atent 
litigation in district court typically costs millions of dollars.”22 One can 
surmise from patent owners’ willingness to spend such sums that they 
have a high level of faith in their legal claims and that they perceive the 
harm they experience as large enough to invest millions into recovery.  
Criminal actions against infringers could reduce civil litigation costs 
both by shifting some enforcement costs to the government and reducing 
the amount of infringement via deterrence mechanisms. The question at 
that point becomes whether this would promote innovation. This could 
occur because criminal sanctions reduce the costs of enforcing patents 
and provide a signal to inventors that society values them as much as it 
does copyright and trademark owners. Patent infringers may also be 
sensitive to being called thieves and criminals, and so this would 
increase the personal costs of infringing patents.  
While this idea holds some appeal at first blush, the differences 
between patents and other forms of intellectual property cause 
significant problems in this context. First, even though the process to 
obtain patents is time-consuming and expensive,23 a large percentage of 
litigated patents are ultimately deemed invalid.24 While the patent term 
is shorter than that for other types of IP protection (twenty years for 
 
22 John F. Duffy, Standing to Challenge Patents, Enforcement Risk, and Separation of 
Powers, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 628, 644 (2015). 
23 The application costs for a patent (including fees paid to the PTO and attorneys) are 
estimated at about $20,000. Jonathan M. Barnett, Property as Process: How, Innovation 
Markets Select Innovation Regimes, 119 YALE L.J. 384, 396 (2009); see also Mark A. Lemley, 
Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495, 1498 (2001) (estimating 
application costs at “$10,000 to $30,000 per patent”). 
24 John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated 
Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 205 (1998). 
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patents versus seventy years plus life of the author for copyright, and 
versus indefinite duration while the mark is in use for trademarks), 
patents provide the greatest level of excludability of these different 
forms of IP. Reverse engineering and independent invention do not 
provide defenses to a claim of patent infringement.25 In contrast, 
copyright allows for an independent creation defense as well as the 
obligation on the part of the copyright owner to accept fair use of her 
works and compulsory licensing in some contexts.26 For trademarks, 
owners have to let other parties use their marks unless it is done 
commercially and leads to consumer confusion, dilution, or a few other 
illicit outcomes.27 
This means that the law is already rather intolerant of any use of 
patented material, and that on top of it, it is not always clear which 
patents are valid at all. The criminal law must provide proper notice to 
the public and define mens rea precisely, but defining willfulness in 
patent infringement for criminal purposes creates risks. Due to recent 
developments in the law, the current standard for willfulness to obtain 
enhanced civil damages is to some extent unsettled, but it may amount 
to an “egregiousness” requirement.28 Because this standard has not 
really been tested, or clarified, in civil cases due to its novelty, it is 
difficult to determine whether it would be workable in the criminal 
context. As a general matter, it is easy to see how analyzing mens rea in 
patent infringement could prove quite confusing to the average criminal 
jury that may struggle with the subject matter of patents in the first 
place. It seems easier, to some extent, to justify criminal sanctions in 
contexts in which 1) willfulness can and is established conclusively and 
2) the invention was such that there was little to no doubt that the patent 
itself was valid.  
Both setting too high and too low a threshold for criminal 
prosecution in the patent context presents problems. If the bar is high, 
and large amounts of hard-to-obtain evidence are required to prove 
willfulness, prosecutors may not want to take the chance of bringing 
cases frequently at all, and even when they do, they may not succeed. 
This would reduce the upsides of having such sanctions because 
infringers may continue to proceed undeterred if there is much to gain 
 
25 The issue of exclusive use in different forms of IP is covered in Brian M. Hoffstadt, 
Dispossession, Intellectual Property, and the Sin of Theoretical Homogeneity, 80 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 909, 951-52 (2007). 
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
28 Halo Elecs. v. Pulse Elecs., 136 S.Ct. 1923 (2016).  
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from infringement and the chance of actually being caught and 
prosecuted is minimal. Meanwhile, a low bar could over-deter 
innovation if individuals who do not wish to take the risk of 
incarceration or other criminal sanctions choose to stay out of the 
invention business altogether or work in areas that produce less useful 
inventions for the public. Ultimately, the realistic goal cannot be to 
reduce the level of patent infringement to zero because that is likely 
impossible without costs so severe to innovation that a cost-benefit 
analysis could not justify doing so.  
Additionally, willful infringement can benefit society if it forces the 
examination of improperly granted patents that stand in the way of 
innovation.29 In the copyright and trademark contexts, it is less often the 
case that willful infringement results in information as to whether 
owners properly received protection in the first place.30 In a further 
difference, any overdeterrence that occurs in the patent context could 
prove more dangerous than overdeterrence for copyrights and 
trademarks. In trademarks, a new producer could probably still find a 
mark of some sort to use even if it is sub-optimal. In copyright, some 
artistic works may not be created or distributed.31 While that can be 
problematic, the consequences in the patent world are far worse if whole 
classes of technology and perhaps even some life-saving medicines 
never see the light of day due to overdeterrence. On top of that, it is 
possible that in at least some cases, criminal sanctions already exist for 
patent infringement through indirect means, such as if a pharmaceutical 
drug infringer also engages in counterfeiting of the original trademark 
attached to the drug.32 In such cases, the marginal benefit of having 
criminal sanctions for the patent infringement portion specifically may 
be low.  
 
29 Multiple scholars have noted that society suffers when civil patent lawsuits are settled if 
bad patents that block “very useful or valuable” technology are allowed to continue existing as 
a result. Jay P. Kesan & Gwendolyn G. Ball, How Are Patent Cases Resolved? An Empirical 
Examination of the Adjudication and Settlement of Patent Disputes, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 237, 
244 (2006). 
30 Indeed, it is patents specifically that are often improvidently granted, and patent 
infringement lawsuits are a tool to uncover that. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. I 
would like to thank Jacqueline Lipton for our conversation on this topic. 
31 See, e.g., Geraldine Szott Moohr, The Crime of Copyright Infringement: An Inquiry 
Based on Morality, Harm, and Criminal Theory, 83 B.U. L. REV. 731, 760 (2003) (“Fear 
of criminal penalties may inhibit second-generation creators from working with material they 
believe may be off-limits—even when such use is in fact lawful.”). 
32 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Distributor of Counterfeit Pharmaceutical Drugs 
Sentenced (Jan. 15, 2009), available at https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-
ccips/legacy/2012/03/15/XuSent.pdf. 
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Differences in the type of infringement we see in the patent context 
versus the copyright and trademark worlds likely also account for the 
lack of criminal sanctions in patents. First, most cases of patent 
infringement do not appear to involve copying or willfulness, so it is 
unclear to what extent intentional infringement—the type that the 
criminal law would punish—represents a significant problem in the 
United States.33 When it comes to the other forms of intellectual 
property, and especially copyright, relatively modern technologies had 
a significant impact on increased levels of infringement, including 
specifically intentional infringement. The ability to reproduce with 
exactitude copyrighted materials and distribute them broadly exploded 
through the advent of the Internet.34 Some have argued that this has 
come at a large loss to the U.S. economy as a matter of revenue and 
jobs.35 Meanwhile, the sale of some types of goods, such as counterfeit 
pharmaceutical drugs distributed over the Internet, can cause grave 
health risks and be difficult to detect.36 In most more innocuous cases, 
the victims of counterfeiting are dispersed and their respective financial 
losses low enough that they are unlikely to go after counterfeiters 
themselves.37 Criminal prosecutions can address that problem by having 
the government seek to protect these victims in a single action.38 In the 
case of copyright infringers, it is the infringers that are often dispersed, 
such as in peer-to-peer sharing contexts. Criminal sanctions against the 
biggest offenders are thought to deter future bad actors and to cost less 
than broad civil litigation.39 Copyright infringers also often do not have 
 
33 Christopher A. Cotropia & Mark A. Lemley, Copying in Patent Law, 87 N.C. L. REV. 
1421, 1451-54 (2009). 
34 See DAVID G. POST, IN SEARCH OF JEFFERSON’S MOOSE: NOTES ON THE STATE OF 
CYBERSPACE 202 (2009). 
35 See 138 CONG. REC. 31,182 (1992); H.R. REP. NO. 106-216, at 3; STEPHEN E. SIWEK, 
INST. FOR POLICY INNOVATION, THE TRUE COST OF COPYRIGHT INDUSTRY PIRACY TO THE 
U.S. ECONOMY 14 (2007), https://www.ipi.org/docLib/20120515_CopyrightPiracy.pdf. But 
see Eric Goldman, A Road to No Warez: The No Electronic Theft Act and Criminal Copyright 
Infringement, 82 OR. L. REV. 369, 397-98 (2003) (criticizing these figures as vastly 
overstating the losses to U.S. copyright owners). 
36 See, e.g., John A. Vernon et al., The Internet and Pharmaceutical Importation: 
Economic Realities and Other Related Issues, 16 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 545, 550-51 (2006).  
37 See David J. Goldstone & Peter J. Toren, The Criminalization of Trademark 
Counterfeiting, 31 CONN. L. REV. 1, 13 (1998). 
38 See id. 
39 See generally Geraldine Szott Moohr, Defining Overcriminalization Through Cost-
Benefit Analysis: The Example of Criminal Copyright Lairs, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 783 (2005) 
(weighing the utilitarian pros and cons of criminalizing copyright infringement, including in 
file-sharing scenarios). 
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much income, and so it is difficult to recover against them even if a civil 
lawsuit proves successful.40  
The advent of the Internet has not affected patent infringement 
figures in the same way. And patent infringers tend to be large 
companies that do have the financial resources to pay for damage 
awards in civil lawsuits,41 which means that corporations have a serious 
financial incentive not to infringe that lower-means individuals in other 
IP contexts may lack.42 Further, patent infringement is not as woven into 
the fabric of our society as trademark and copyright infringement. 
Counterfeiting can affect the economic and even physical well-being of 
individuals. Copyright infringement can include regular people and 
potentially desensitize them to committing other forms of legal 
violations. Because patent infringement largely occurs between 
corporations, it is unlikely to have these effects. These factors make 
criminal sanctions less justifiable in the patent context than for 
copyright and trademarks.  
Some of the development of the law, and of the differences between 
patent law on the one hand and copyright/trademark law on the other, 
can be traced back to public choice factors rather than utilitarian or 
moral rationales, however. The Recording Industry Association of 
America (RIAA) and the Motion Picture Association of America 
(MPAA) repeatedly pushed for increased criminal sanctions over the 
years because they thought that civil sanctions or insufficiently harsh 
criminal laws were not enough to deter infringement.43 These 
organizations managed to expand which acts would count as felonies 
under the law and how high the monetary fines and prison sentence 
 
40 See Ray Beckerman, Ha Ha Ha Ha Ha. RIAA Paid Its Lawyers More Than $16,000,000 
in 2008 to Recover Only $391,000!!!, RECORDING INDUSTRY VS THE PEOPLE (July 13, 2010, 
11:26 AM), http://recordingindustryvspeople.blogspot.com/2010/07/ha-ha-ha-ha-ha-riaa-paid-
its-lawyers.html. 
41 One study of 1000 patents found that 707 were owned by large companies, and that 293 
were owned by small entities, 175 of which were individuals. John R. Allison & Mark A. 
Lemley, Who’s Patenting What? An Empirical Exploration of Patent Prosecution, 53 VAND. 
L. REV. 2099, 2117 (2000). 
42 This also means that if violations occur, the victims of patent infringement are more 
likely to be compensated for the harms they experienced than do the victims of other types of 
intellectual property infringement. This is especially true because some of the most blatant 
cases of patent infringement risk drawing awards of treble damages and attorney’s fees. 
43 Lanier Saperstein, Comment, Copyrights, Criminal Sanctions and Economic Rents: 
Applying the Rent Seeking Model to the Criminal Law Formulation Process, 87 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 1470, 1478-79 (1997) (citing Piracy and Counterfeiting Amendments Act of 
981: Hearing on S. 691 Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Law, of the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 97th Cong. 27 (1981) (joint statement of the MPAA and RIAA)). 
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maxima would run.44 Lobbying is a logical act as a matter of self-interest 
on the part of the RIAA, MPAA, and various other organizations. Large 
copyright owners tend to be frequent victims of copyright infringement 
and most do not commit great amounts of infringement themselves. 
These owners have to spend significant sums to pursue their claims in 
court, often do not recover much money, and, as discussed, experience 
that civil sanctions may not prove as effective a deterrent as criminal 
penalties.45 Trademark owners are also generally organized to favor 
harsher laws because they tend to be the victims rather than perpetrators 
of infringement.  
There is some historical evidence to suggest that the United States 
and other governments have better insulated the patent system from 
lobbying.46 That said, patent lobbies can be powerful, in part because 
most people are fairly indifferent as to how their Congressmen vote in 
the context of patent laws. What has kept sanctions in check regardless, 
however, is that large pharmaceutical companies have tended to favor 
large sanctions while information technology (IT) firms have gone 
against that trend.47 Unlike big pharma, IT corporations are likely to find 
themselves accused of patent infringement rather than just being its 
victims.48 Hence, they often do not wish to expose themselves to the risk 
of greater liability that harsher laws would cause.49 Over the long term, 
changes in the relative power of the pharmaceutical versus IT industries 
could influence the level of patent enforcement and associated sanctions 
that we see.50 
Technological changes could also affect the calculus and Congress’s 
willingness to pass criminal sanctions for patent infringement. One of 
 
44 Id. at 1480. 
45 See id. at 1507-08. 
46 See Craig Allen Nard & Andrew P. Morriss, Constitutionalizing Patents: From Venice 
to Philadelphia, 2 REV. L. & ECON. 223, 309 (2006). 
47 See Jay P. Kesan & Andres A. Gallo, The Political Economy of the Patent System, 87 
N.C. L. REV. 1341, 1369-70, 1376 (2009). 
48 Id. at 1369-70. 
49 Id. 
50 Pharmaceutical companies may further be influenced by two other factors. One is 
substitution effects whereby illicit drugs might also be trademarked under a counterfeit name, 
which would draw the risk of criminal sanctions as it is. See Manta, Puzzle of Criminal 
Sanctions, supra note 1, at 499-500. Second, the makers of generic drugs often concede 
infringement altogether—while contesting the validity of the original patent—under the Hatch-
Waxman Act because they have to show bioequivalence to the existing drugs. See Janet 
Freilich, The Paradox of Legal Equivalents and Scientific Equivalence: Reconciling Patent 
Law’s Doctrine of Equivalents with the FDA’s Bioequivalence Requirement, 66 SMU L. REV. 
59, 76 (2013). 
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the most salient examples in this context is the advent of 3D printing,51 
whose potential to increase opportunities for trademark violations I have 
noted previously.52 This technology has the potential to disrupt 
intellectual property as we know it because users can share computer-
aided design (CAD) files digitally that would enable users from all over 
the world to infringe on patented inventions as long as they have the 
necessary raw materials and printer.53 Should this start occurring on a 
large scale, patent owners would quite likely band together to encourage 
and lobby Congress to pass more punitive legislation, including quite 
possibly criminal sanctions. 
III. BACKLASH TO HARSH SANCTIONS 
Even when IP owners manage to get harsh laws passed that carry hefty 
civil damages or criminal sanctions with them, the possibility of later 
upheaval by the population remains. This is particularly true in the 
copyright context, in part because such a large percentage of American 
Internet users has engaged in some degree of infringement.54 The public 
reaction was galvanized by the sky-high civil damages that copyright 
owners obtained against Boston University student Joel Tenenbaum and 
Minnesota mom Jammie Thomas-Rasset, who would each come to owe 
hundreds of thousands of dollars for illegal downloading.55 While such 
high sanctions, according to scholarly work on the subject, appear to have 
some effect on deterring future illegal downloads, the effects are 
temporary and illicit behavior tends to resume eventually.56 
Many people had not necessarily paid much attention to intellectual 
property legislation in the pre-Internet era, but grassroots efforts took hold 
and ultimately defeated the bills for the Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA) in 
the House of Representatives57 and for the Preventing Real Online Threats 
 
51 See Deven R. Desai & Gerard N. Magliocca, Patents, Meet Napster: 3D Printing and 
the Digitization of Things, 102 GEO. L.J. 1691 (2014); Dinusha Mendis et al., The Future of 
Printcrime: Intellectual Property, Innovation Law, and 3D Printing, 3D PRINTING AND 
BEYOND: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND REGULATION 361 (Dinusha Mendis et al., eds. 
2019); Lucas Osborn, Regulating Three-Dimensional Printing: The Converging Worlds of Bits 
and Atoms, 51 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 553 (2014). 
52 See Irina D. Manta, Intellectual Property and the Presumption of Innocence, 56 WM & 
MARY L. REV. 1745, 1780 (2015).   
53 See Timothy R. Holbrook & Lucas Osborn, Digital Patent Infringement in an Era of 3D 
Printing, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1319, 1372 (2015). 
54 See Annemarie Bridy, Why Pirates Won’t Behave: Regulating P2P in the Decade After 
Napster, 40 RUTGERS L.J. 565, 604 (2009). 
55 Sony BMG Music Entm’t v. Tenenbaum, 721 F. Supp. 2d 85, 87, 121 (D. Mass. 2010). 
56 See Bridy, supra note 54. 
57 H.R. 3261, 112th Cong. (2011). 
2019]   EXPLAINING CRIMINAL SANCTIONS IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 32 
to Economic Creativity and Theft of Intellectual Property Act (PIPA, or 
also PROTECT IP Act) in the Senate.58 These bills would have enabled 
the possibility of court orders to thwart advertisers and banks from 
engaging in financial dealings with infringing websites, as well as of court 
orders that could make Internet Service Providers (ISPs) prevent access to 
websites or make search engines like Google and their brethren block links 
to infringing sites.59 SOPA also came with criminal sanctions that included 
up to five years’ imprisonment for anyone who illegally streamed 
copyrighted works.60  
Online petitions garnered millions of signatures, and websites like 
Wikipedia and Reddit rose up in protest.61 Others such as Google, Flickr, 
and Mozilla soon joined. Unlike in many previous contexts, large 
copyright owners did not unite in the effort to pass SOPA/PIPA, and 
Silicon Valley proved to be an opponent to the entertainment world for the 
first time.62 The combination of angered Internet users and pushback from 
several major corporations proved fatal to the bills even though those bills 
did not plan to change the actual substance of intellectual property law.  
The inclusion of harsh sanctions, however, set against the backdrop of 
aggressive enforcement of copyright law against the likes of Thomas-
Rasset and Tenenbaum, contributed to the success of the protests. Indeed, 
studies show that individuals’ intuitions about what constitutes ethical 
punishment of copyright infringement is directly connected to the level of 
sanctions imposed.63 While many people support warnings and fines, few 
wish to see offenders disconnected from the Internet or put in jail.64 Most 
of the people who expressed support for fines in one study would have 
limited them to below $100, which is vastly below the statutory penalties 
 
58 S. 968, 112th Cong. (2011). 
59 See H.R. 3261 § 102(c)(2)(A)-(D); S. 968, § 3(d)(B)-(D). 
60 See H.R. 3261 § 201(a); see also 18 U.S.C. 2319(b)(1) (2006). 
61 Larry Downes, Who Really Stopped SOPA, and Why?, FORBES (Jan. 25, 2012, 1:15 
AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/larrydownes/2012/01/25/who-really-stopped-sopa-and-
why. 
62 Yochai Benkler, Seven Lessons from SOPA/PIPA/Megaupload and Four Proposals on 
Where We Go from Here, TECHPRESIDENT (Jan. 25, 2012), 
http://techpresident.com/news/21680/seven-lessons-sopapipamegauplaod-and-four-proposals-
where-we-go-here; see also David Post, What the Hell Happened? The Campaign Against 
(and Defeat of) SOPA, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Sept. 17, 2013, 11:21 AM), 
http://www.volokh.com/2013/09/17/happened-bring-sopas-downfall (analyzing the factors that 
led to the downfall of SOPA). 
63 See Ben Depoorter et al., Copyright Backlash, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 1251, 1278-83 
(2011); Ben Depoorter & Sven Vanneste, Norms and Enforcement: The Case Against 
Copyright Litigation, 84 OR. L. REV. 1127, 1161 (2005). 
64 Joe Karaganis, Am. Assembly, Copyright Infringement and Enforcement in the US, 2 
(Nov. 2011), http://piracy.americanassembly.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/AA-Research-
Note-Infringement-and-Enforcement-November-2011.pdf, at 6. 
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for copyright infringement.65 Answers in this area were also sensitive to 
the particular phrasing of survey questions, suggesting that the portrayal 
of copyright issues in the media might have an important effect on 
individuals’ perceptions and likelihood of taking political action.66 
The media may have also contributed to people’s existing biases 
toward developing empathy for identifiable perceived victims of harsh 
sanctions (as opposed to remote statistical victims). Thomas-Rasset, 
Tenenbaum, and others became the faces of a struggle against large 
corporate actors who, according to significant portions of the public, 
suffered questionable economic harms. The SOPA/PIPA bills increased 
individuals’ fears of what could happen if they themselves got caught 
infringing, given how life-changing the pre-existing civil statutory 
sanctions on the books already turned out to be for some.  
The most prominent actor in the context of harsh sanctions, however, 
was Aaron Swartz, an anti-SOPA activist that the DOJ later prosecuted for 
his own involvement with copyright infringement. Swartz rose to tech 
fame due to his roles in helping to form Reddit, the Creative Commons 
Project, and OpenLibrary.org.67 In 2011, in an effort to give the public free 
access to subscription-only articles in the academic database JSTOR, he 
broke into computer networks at M.I.T. by leaving a laptop connected to 
the system in a closet and then downloading 4.8 million documents after 
signing in under a false account.68 His plan to release the documents failed 
because he was caught by law enforcement.69 Prosecutors charged him 
with a total of thirteen criminal counts,70 and he faced up to thirty-five 
years in prison as well as other consequences such as a fine of up to $1 
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neighborhood of seven years had a court convicted him,72 but we will 
never find out the exact figure because Aaron Swartz took his own life by 
hanging before the case proceeded.73  
There is scholarly disagreement on the firmness of the legal foundation 
of his prosecution.74 As a more general matter, however, it is indeed likely 
that many people today have engaged in behavior that would theoretically 
fall under the purview of the criminal law.75 Some policymakers and 
scholars have suggested changes to the laws that made Swartz’s 
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prosecution possible,76 and there were bipartisan criticisms77 and public 
demonstrations after his death.78 Many, including a number of 
Congressmen, asked whether Swartz would have been prosecuted as 
harshly but for his opposition efforts to SOPA,79 which is a disconcerting 
possibility for those concerned with free expression in our society. The 
DOJ came under suspicion that it sought to make an example of Swartz 
because he was a famous figure that angered the government when 
criticizing SOPA and attempting to distribute documents to the public that 
usually require individual payments through the PACER system.80  
The criminal law system relies on the fact that 95% of charged 
individuals accept plea bargains.81 Having large sanctions on the books 
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ensures that this number remains high, but the question is at what cost.82 
Swartz was one of the few that did not want to “take the deal”—while he 
worried about the possibility of prison, he was most concerned about being 
branded a felon.83 It is questionable whether the drafters of the criminal 
laws that may have been used ultimately to convict Swartz envisioned 
defendants like him. His case, and those of people like Thomas-Rasset and 
Tenenbaum in the civil setting, shows that bills involving new criminal or 
civil sanctions against offenders in the quickly developing world of 
information reproduction and dissemination deserve special attention. 
CONCLUSION 
Patents and copyrights are both protected by the same constitutional 
clause, and both regimes seek to incentivize the creation of more 
intangible goods from which society will benefit. They both struggle with 
defining how much an individual must add to the goods that preceded it 
before protection kicks in, and with how best to punish legal violations. 
Copyright law, like trademark law but unlike patent law, has chosen to 
include the possibility of criminal sanctions. As this symposium piece 
describes, this has come about for both utilitarian reasons and due to the 
nature of the American public choice landscape. Copyright owners’ ability 
to push for increased sanctions and enforcement has, however, hit some 
roadblocks in recent times. Similarly to how tech companies have put up 
an important obstacle to the expansion of patent infringement sanctions, 
they—together with popular grassroots movements—have now drawn 
lines in the copyright context. The future will show whether these 
developments will eventually lead to greater convergence between 
copyright enforcement and patent enforcement. 
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